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Atividade
| 134535 - Desenhos de Mercado |
| Período da turma: | 05/08/2025 a 05/12/2026
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| Descrição: | OBJETIVOS DA DISCIPLINA
O conceito de um mercado de energia elétrica é algo recente do ponto de vista histórico quando consideramos que o primeiro movimento competitivo relevante ocorre por meio da lei PURPA em 1978 nos Estados Unidos, com a lógica de criar um comprador único. Posteriormente entre 1982 e 1988 são construídas as bases de um primeiro modelo competitivo em nível de atacado no Chile, o que na sequência foi escalado e aprimorado no Reino Unido entre 1989-1990. A adoção de modelos atacadistas visando a competição na geração e na comercialização ganha visibilidade mundial e passa a ser adotado nos países nórdicos, partes dos Estados Unidos e na Europa Ocidental. Mas recentemente, no final da década de 1990 e início dos anos 2000 começa a revolução atacadista, no qual todos os consumidores passam a ter direito a escolher o supridor de energia em algumas jurisdições, com destaque para Austrália, Nova Zelândia, Europa, EUA (Texas e alguns estados). A lógica de um mercado competitivo é trazer eficiência na alocação de riscos e custos, além de facilitar a adoção de novas tecnologias. A disciplina “Desenhos de Mercado de Energia” visa apresentar os fundamentos econômicos e técnicos para introdução de modelos competitivos, como também as diferentes opções adotadas internacionalmente, em termos da definição macro do desenho (comprador único, competição atacadista e competição varejista), além dos aspectos de arquitetura de mercado e formação do preço spot. OBJETIVOS DE APRENDIZAGEM Ao final desta disciplina, os alunos deverão compreender os fundamentos para introdução de modelos competitivos, opções adotadas internacionalmente, além dos aspectos de arquitetura de mercado e formação do preço spot. CONTEÚDO PROGRAMÁTICO Inicialmente serão analisados os princípios que levam um país ou região a adotar um determinado desenho de mercado. A partir do entendimento desses princípios, são discutidos os diferentes desenhos de mercado e como isto se reflete na formação de preços e em aspectos práticos da operação do mercado. Considerando os conceitos de mercados de energia, a disciplina apresenta a experiência prática implementada nos Estados Unidos, Europa, Austrália, Ásia (Japão, China e Sudeste Asiático) e América Latina. Após análise das experiências internacionais, são apresentadas discussões sobre o desenho de mercado do futuro, considerando aspectos como o fatiamento de produtos, novas tecnologias e uma nova visão para a formação do preço spot. METODOLOGIA Aulas expositivas com discussões e debates considerando a bibliografia apresentada e estudos recentes sobre o tema de desenho de mercado. CRITÉRIO DE AVALIAÇÃO Prova escrita com ao menos 20 questões de múltipla escolha na qual uma pergunta errada anula uma certa, sendo que uma pergunta sem resposta não soma e nem reduz a pontuação. 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CRAMTON, P., SHOHAM, Y., STEINBERG, R. (eds.) Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2006. DAVID, S. M. G. R. Geração de Energia Elétrica no Brasil: Uma visão Legal-Regulatória sobre Riscos para o Desenvolvimento da Atividade e Mecanismos de Incentivo Estabelecidos pelo Poder Público. (Dissertação de Mestrado). São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. DE CASTRO, N, et al. Desequilíbrio econômico e financeiro das usinas termoelétricas frente à persistência da crise hidrológica: 2012-2014. Texto de Discussão do Setor Elétrico n.º 61. GESEL – Grupo de Estudos do Setor Elétrico da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro, 2014. Disponível em: DEL RIO, P. Auctions for Renewable Support in Portugal: Instruments and lessons learnt. AURES – Auctions for Renewable Energy Support. Technical University of Denmark, 2016a. DEL RIO, P. Auctions for Renewable Support in South Africa: Instruments and lessons learnt. AURES – Auctions for Renewable Energy Support. 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Disponível em: XIYING, L., LINGCHENG, K. A New Chapter in China’s Electricity Market Reform. Energy Studies Institute: Policy Brief 13. Singapore, 2016. Disponível em: COMPROMISSO ÉTICO – PROFESSOR/ ALUNO Respeito do professor a todos os alunos, preparando-se para as aulas, respondendo a dúvidas, avaliando-os com isenção e imparcialidade e procurando ajudá-los no que estiver ao seu alcance. Respeito dos alunos ao professor e aos seus colegas, comportando-se nas aulas de maneira a não prejudicar seu andamento normal, enriquecendo sempre que possível com perguntas e dúvidas pertinentes aos assuntos tratados e preparando-se para as aulas de maneira a aproveitá-las ao máximo. ATIVIDADES EXTRA CLASSE Leitura de bibliografia sugerida. |
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31 horas |
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| Tipo: | Obrigatória | ||||
| Vagas oferecidas: | 80 | ||||
| Ministrantes: |
Alexandre Guedes Viana |
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