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Júpiter - Sistema de Graduação

Faculdade de Direito
 
Filosofia e Teoria Geral do Direito
 
Disciplina: DFD0136 - Legal Theory

Créditos Aula: 4
Créditos Trabalho: 1
Tipo: Semestral

Objetivos
OBJECTIVES (em inglês): This subject’s aim is to offer a critical and conceptually demanding reading of contemporary books and debates in legal theory and philosophy of law in Anglo American Tradition. The course will consist in a systematic and profound reading of referential texts for the contemporary debate, with three main purposes: 1 – Methodological purpose: to present a rigorous and internal reading of some contemporary theoretical debates, taking the premises of the studied authors; 2 – Substantive Purpose: to present some of the main agendas of the contemporary theoretical debates, taking a work or system of ideas as the guide for such study; 3: to offer a comparative analysis between authors and systems of ideas that skirmish over one of the themes that was chosen as the thread for the semester. This semester will focus on the relationships between Law and Justice.
 
Docente(s) Responsável(eis)
Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior
 
Ementa
Legal Theory

1. Anglo-American Classical Tradition 2. Kelsen´s legal positivism 3. Hart´s Legal positivism and the linguistic turn 4. Dworkin´s critique of legal positivism and the interpretivist approach 5. The new Natural Law Tradition 6. Legal Pragmatism 7 Recent developments in contemporary legal theory
 
Conteúdo Programático
The tradition of theoretical legal studies in the Faculty of Law is usually directed towards the study of themes or problems, but rarely to the analysis and investigation of the specific systems of thought that aim to answer such problems. The lack of courses oriented towards the systematic and rigorous reading has produced a pattern of absorption and theoretical reflection that is hasty or flawed by an inconsistent eclecticism, in which many authors are read, assimilated in academic works and largely cited, but without due care from the part of the researcher regarding the theoretical consistency of such “incorporations”. From the methodological point of view, this course intends to offer an exercise of structural and systematic reading of systems of thought, in first place, starting from its internal premises, and after, from some of the critics such ideas received from their most refined interlocutors.
From the point of view of content, the main idea is to unpack some of the referential authors of the contemporary debate in order to, from them, find an entrance door for this same debate, situating its questions and problems. The course, in this sense, embraces the premise that exist many “entrance doors” for the understanding of the contemporary debate offered by the answers that diverse theoretical systems give to the problems and questions animated by it.
The shifting of these references aims to allow the students an organized and systematic access route to some of the main theoretical agendas of our time. It is worthy of note that the very identification of such agenda of questions and problems is usually one of the main difficulties faced by students interested in the subject of legal theory and philosophy of law.



1. Anglo-American Classical Tradition 2. Kelsen´s legal positivism 3. Hart´s Legal positivism and the linguistic turn 4. Dworkin´s critique of legal positivism and the interpretivist approach 5. The new Natural Law Tradition 6. Legal Pragmatism 7 Recent developments in contemporary legal theory
 
Instrumentos e Critérios de Avaliação
 
      Método de Avaliação
      Métodos utilizados:
Conference, Case Study and Socratic Method (reframed).
 
      Critério de Avaliação
      CRITÉRIOS DE AVALIAÇÃO (em inglês):
Assessment will be made through: (1) participation in classes; (2) presentation of seminar; (3) final essay.
 
      Norma de Recuperação
      18. Remedial standards (approval criteria and times of tests or assignments):

Minimum regimental attendance and final grade of not less than 3.0 (three).
 
Bibliografia
BIBLIOGRAFIA:
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• BEN-MENAHEM, Yemima. Conventionalism: from Poincaré to Quine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• BIX, Brian. Analyzing law: new essays in legal theory, Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
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• BIX, Brian. Law, language and legal determinacy. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993.
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• KRAMER, Matthew H. In defense of legal positivism: law without trimmings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
• KRESS, Kenneth. The interpretive turn. Ethics, Chicago, v. 97, p. 834-60, 1987.
• KRONMAN, Anthony. Education’s end: why our colleges and universities have given up on the meaning of life. New York: Yale University Press, 2008.
• KRONMAN, Anthony. The lost lawyer: failing ideals of the legal profession. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
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Requisitos
Os Requisitos variam conforme o curso para o qual ela é oferecida.

Clique para consultar o oferecimento para DFD0136.
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